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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than 400,000 children currently in the custody of state-run
foster care systems,' and for over a million more who will become subjects
of dependency court litigation in the next decade, 2 the American Bar Associ-
* Associate Director, Children's Rights (www.childrensrights.org), New York, N.Y.;
J.D., Boston University School of Law. The authors would like to thank Bea Paterno for her
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Independent consultant to child-serving non-profit organizations (www.erikpitchal.
com); Lecturer in Law, Northeastern University; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. Based on data from fifty states, 408,425 children were in the custody of state-run
foster care systems on September 30, 2010. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL.,
THE AFCARS REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-res
earch/afcars/tar/reportl 8.htm.
2. Based on data from forty-three states, 17.6% of child victims had court actions in
2009. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2009 85 (2009),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cmO9.pdf. In the same year, an
estimated "702,000 ... children were victims of maltreatment." Id. at 21. Additionally, an
estimated 98,339 child victims had court actions in 2009. Id. at 93. If the maltreatment num-
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ation's (ABA's) 2011 Model Act Governing the Representation of Children
in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings' (2011 Model Act) offers
tremendous hope. To be sure, the 2011 Model Act is a ringing reaffirmation
of the ABA's 1996 pronouncement of what child advocacy should look like.4
However, the 2011 Model Act is also a concession by the ABA that the
promulgation of standards of practice was insufficient to convince states to
actually provide adequate, effective, and zealous counsel to all children in
the child welfare system.5 With the 2011 Model Act, the ABA now takes the
official policy position that states should implement a very specific approach
to child representation-one that guarantees that all children in dependency
cases are provided a lawyer who is well trained, decently paid, committed to
the fundamental principles of lawyering, and who has a reasonable caseload.
Unquestionably, the practice of child welfare law has matured greatly in
the forty years since the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act first
required states to provide a "guardian ad litem" to all children in dependency
cases, as a mandate in exchange for each state's receipt of federal financial
support for child abuse programs.7 Most states now require the appointment
of a lawyer in these circumstances,' and a variety of professional organiza-
tions, 9 training programs,'0 academic scholarship," and financial resources
bers stay consistent, 983,390 child victims will have court actions over the next ten years. See
id.
3. See generally MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE,
NEGLECT, & DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Model Act].
4. Compare id., with STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT
CHILDREN IN ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES (1996) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
5. Sadly, there has not yet been any clear action at the federal level, either through spe-
cific federal legislation or through the judicial recognition of a federal constitutional right to
counsel for children in all dependency proceedings.
6. 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, §§ 1-4.
7. Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, §
4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7.
8. See CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
9. Among other organizations that support the development of child welfare law and its
practice are the NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 5 (2001), available at http:/l
www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/docs/nacc-standardsandrecommend.pdf; About the
Center, A.B.A. CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE L., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/childlaw
.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); Children's Rights Litigation Committee, A.B.A. SEC. OF
LITIG., http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/about.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012).
10. Noteworthy training opportunities in child welfare law include the NACC's Annual
Child Welfare, Juvenile and Family Law Conference, Red Book Trainings, and Curriculum
Development. See David Lansner, The National Conference on Children and the Law, A.B.A.
SEC. OF LITIG. (Oct. 25, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/c
408 [Vol.36
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss2/7
LESSONS FROM KENNY A.
are now available to support this advocacy work. The National Association
of Counsel for Children (NACC), based in Denver, has over 2000 mem-
bers-mostly child welfare lawyers and judges-and offers a certification
program in thirty-one states, providing experienced attorneys an appropriate
credential to show the world their expertise in child welfare law and elevate
the reputation of the profession generally.12
Despite this progress, states' performance in implementing the Stan-
dards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse & Neglect
Cases (ABA Standards) lags. In a recent national report card by First Star
and Children's Advocacy Institution (CAI),13 assessing the degree to which
states are fulfilling the promise of counsel for children, researchers deter-
mined that only eleven states earned an "A." 4 Fifteen states earned a "D" or
"F," and roughly one-third of the states do not require the appointment of
counsel at all.' 5 Notably, the First Star and CAI report card only analyzed
the law, not its implementation.16 Anecdotally, children's lawyers around the
nation-even in those states that earned an "A" on the First Star and CAI
report card-regularly complain that they have far too many cases, not
enough training, and inadequate pay. 7 In short, it is well known in this field,
if not openly recognized within the legal profession, that well-meaning and
ontent/articles/fall20 11 -national-conference-children-law.html; Trainings, Accreditation and
Assessments FAQs, NACC, http://www.naccchildlaw.org/?page=FactSheet (last visited Feb.
26, 2012).
11. The scholarship in the area of child representation is extensive. See, e.g., CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES (Donald N. Duquette & Ann M. Haralambie eds.,
2d ed. 2010); Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 573 (2008); Michael J.
Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termina-
tion of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REv. 305
(2011); Martin Guggenheim, How Children's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. L.J. 805
(2006); Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective Proceed-
ings, 22 ToURo L. REv. 745 (2006); Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers for Children Stop Read-
ing Goldstein, Freud and Solnit? Lessons from the Twentieth Century on Best Interests and
the Role of the Child Advocate, 41 FAM. L.Q. 393 (2007).
12. Become an NACC Certified Child Welfare Law Specialist, NACC, http://www.naccc
hildlaw.org/?page=Certification (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
13. FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INST., A CHILD's RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
(2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/MisclFinalRTC_2ndEdition_1r.pdf.
14. Id. at 8.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 13-14.
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talented lawyers who want to do the right thing for their child-clients are
nonetheless committing malpractice every day.
At the very least, the 2011 Model Act provides an opportunity for re-
newed attention, energy, and commitment to the principle that every child
who is the subject of an abuse or neglect petition should have an effective
lawyer at all stages of his or her experience in the dependency courts." With
its passage, advocates are well poised to press legislatures and court officials
in many states to enact its language and fulfill its promises. Any state that
adopts the 2011 Model Act is likely to earn an "A" on the next report card.
Importantly, the question remains whether an "A" for excellence in leg-
islative drafting translates to something meaningful for children on the
ground. Certainly, successful implementation will depend on who is in-
volved in the translation effort and what steps they take. This essay de-
scribes one radical, systemic transformation of child advocacy-one that was
inspired by the ABA Standards-and pushed in part by impact litigation-
and how it happened. Because this change was grounded in core principles
that later found animation in the 2011 Model Act, the story of how this over-
haul happened may be instructive for those jurisdictions interested in imple-
menting the 2011 Model Act. This is the story of the Kenny A. ex rel. Winn
v. Perduel9 litigation.
II. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Anyone familiar with the American child welfare system knows of the
significant challenges state and local governments have faced over the last
forty years in safely and effectively caring for foster children.20 While a full
recitation of the often sorry state of public child welfare systems is beyond
the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that Kenny A.'s right-to-counsel
narrative is part of a broader story of a failing foster care system in metropol-
itan Atlanta. As they had done successfully in many other jurisdictions, in
2002, lawyers from the national non-profit advocacy group, Children's
Rights-in conjunction with prominent local counsel 21-brought a class ac-
18. See 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 3(a).
19. 218 F.R.D. 277 (N.D. Ga. 2003). The authors were part of the team of lawyers who
represented the plaintiff foster children in Kenny A. Id. at 283. No confidential or privileged
material is described in this essay.
20. See, e.g., First Star Foster Children Issues and News: Foster Care Challenge Con-
tinues, FIRST STAR (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.firststar.orglabout-first-star/first-star-newsfeed
/itemid/355/vw/l.aspx.
21. The authors would be remiss if they did not recognize the extraordinary contribution
of Jeffrey 0. Bramlett, an attorney and partner at the firm of Bondurant Mixson & Elmore,
L.L.P. in Atlanta, who has continued to serve as co-lead counsel from the very beginning of
410 [Vol.36
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tion suit on behalf of all 3000 foster children in the custody of Georgia's
child welfare agency whose cases originated in Fulton and DeKalb Coun-
ties.22 The claims that would become known as the "state case" alleged that
as a direct result of systemic agency failures, Georgia officials-in their offi-
cial capacities-were violating the federal constitutional and statutory rights
of children to be safe while in state custody in foster care, to receive required
services, and to be provided opportunities for and efforts toward finding a
permanent home.23 As with Children's Rights' other cases, the allegations
lodged against the Georgia system were deservedly explosive: Children who
had been removed from their parents' homes for their own safety were being
severely abused, horribly neglected, denied basic health care and educational
services, and left to languish for years if not their entire childhood in state
custody.24 The complaint laid out the utter brokenness of the State's De-
partment of Human Resources and its statewide Division of Family and
Children's Services, as operated in metropolitan Atlanta (Fulton and DeKalb
Counties).25
Of course, no child ends up in foster care without the approval of a ju-
venile court judge; and as plaintiffs' counsel investigated the problems in the
Atlanta area foster care system, they discovered that the provision of counsel
for foster children in the Atlanta juvenile courts was illusory.26 Indeed, those
charged with protecting individual foster children's interests during the pen-
dency of their child protection cases in juvenile court-the "child advocate
attorneys"-were unable to perform the minimum duties one might expect of
them, due to crushing caseloads of 500 or more children per lawyer.27 The
children were thus "caught in the grip of an uncaring, unconstitutional vice
the Kenny A. reform campaign, and actively illustrates the power of partnership between the
private bar and public interest organizations in civil rights reform litigation.
22. First Amended Complaint exh. A at 14, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D.
277 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS), available at http://www.childrensrights.org
/wp-content/uploads//2009/01/2003-08 20_amendedcomplaint file stamped.pdf; see also
Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 283. Kenny A. was originally filed in state court, although it included
federal claims. Notice of Removal at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS). Shortly after it was filed, the defendants re-
moved the matter to federal court. Id.; Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 284. Plaintiffs later filed an
amended complaint. First Amended Complaint, supra at 1.
23. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 3-6, 34-37; see Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at
283.
24. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 3-5.
25. See generally id.
26. See id. at 5, 48-50; Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right to Counsel in De-
pendency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 663, 668-69 (2006).
27. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 5; Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669.
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where even their own putative advocates were unable to help them."28 Ad-
vocates for children in metropolitan Atlanta were galvanized by the need for
significant reform in the representation of children in the juvenile court.
Because Georgia law makes each of the 159 counties responsible for provid-
ing lawyers in juvenile court proceedings to litigants who cannot afford
them, plaintiffs in Kenny A. named Fulton and DeKalb Counties as defen-
dants, in addition to state officials. 29 The right-to-counsel aspect of the law-
suit thus became known as the "county case."
The county case was aggressively litigated. During discovery, plaintiffs
deposed several key leaders in the counties, including the Fulton County
Juvenile Court Administrator and the Chief Judge of the DeKalb County
Juvenile Court.30 Plaintiffs' counsel also deposed child advocate attorneys
from each county, learning more details about their inability to, among other
things, meet each client on their caseload and conduct robust, independent
investigations of each case.3 ' One of the attorneys characterized the task of
meeting with each child client as "aspirational."32 Plaintiffs' counsel also
deposed the then-executive director of the NACC regarding the NACC's
recommendation that a full-time children's attorney in dependency court
should have no more than 100 open child clients at any time, including ade-
quate support staff.33 By the time discovery ended, caseloads were down to
an average of 439 in Fulton County and 183 in DeKalb County-lower than
28. Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669 (describing Kenny A. litigation). The "vice" turned out
to be an important element of the complaint when it came to staving off the state's motion to
dismiss on Younger abstention grounds. See Kenny A., 218 F.R.D. at 285-87; State Defen-
dant's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2002). Under the Younger abstention doctrine, providing a rare and ex-
traordinary exception to a federal court hearing cases properly before it, Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971), federal courts must abstain from deciding cases when, among other
things, to do so would interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding involving the same
litigants. In Kenny A., plaintiffs successfully argued that the Younger test was not met, among
other things, because-as alleged in the complaint-they were not able to obtain any mea-
ningful relief in Juvenile Court on account of their advocates' overwhelming caseloads. Ken-
ny A., 218 F.R.D. at 287. The court was also persuaded that the defendants had waived any
abstention argument when they voluntarily removed the case from state court to the federal
forum. Id. at 285.
29. First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 9-13; Pitchal, supra note 26, at 667-69.
30. See Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga.
2005); see also Pitchal, supra note 26, at 669 n.33, 670.
31. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63.
32. Id. at 1363.
33. Id. at 1362; NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 7.
412 [Vol.36
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at the initiation of the case, but still well above the NACC recommenda-
tion.34
At the close of discovery, the counties moved for summary judgment,
essentially arguing that foster children in Georgia do not have the right to
counsel in juvenile court dependency cases.3 ' Because children lacked this
right-the argument went-the counties' decision to provide lawyers who
36
may be practicing below minimum standards was of no legal significance.
Thus, the first challenge of the case-and the first major victory-was to
establish, as a matter of law, that foster children have the right to a lawyer in
dependency court. 37  Plaintiffs' right-to-counsel claim was based on the
Georgia State Constitution's due process clause, but the district court ana-
lyzed the issue under the Mathews v. Eldridge38 test because under Georgia
law, due process protections are co-extensive with the federal analogue.39
Mathews teaches that when determining whether a given procedural protec-
tion is required, courts must balance three factors: 1) the liberty interest at
stake; 2) the risk of erroneous results without the desired protection; and 3)
the state's interest, including fiscal considerations.4 0
As one of us has previously written,4 ' the court's decision in Kenny A.
was as straightforward in approach as it was remarkable in outcome. Finding
that foster children have a liberty interest at stake in all dependency cases,
34. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1356; NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra
note 9, at 7. There were two reasons for the drop in caseloads. First, there was a decline in
the foster care census-something that was outside the control of the counties-a trend that
continued in the years following. See JAMES T. DIMAS & SARAH A. MORRISON, PERIOD 10
MONITORING REPORT 126, 128 (2011) [hereinafter STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2011-060
6_ga-period 10-monitoring-report.pdf. Second, between the filing of the case and the reso-
lution of the summary judgment motion, DeKalb County-the smaller of the two-had hired
an additional three child advocate attorneys, bringing their total staffing to five. See Kenny A.,
356 F. Supp. 2d at 1356, 1356 n.3.
35. See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of State Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 WL
5503780 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 13, 2004).
36. See generally id.
37. See generally id. Less challenging was prevailing on the related argument that if
there is a right to counsel, then there is also a right to effective counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985) ("It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel." (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14
(1970) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
38. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
39. See Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1355, 1360; Hood v. Carsten, 481 S.E.2d 525, 527
(Ga. 1997).
40. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
41. See Pitchal, supra note 26, at 675.
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due to the possibility that they could be placed by the public agency in an
environment restrictive of their physical movements, and finding that the
imprecise standards used in juvenile court proceedings led to an unaccepta-
bly high risk of erroneous outcomes, the court held that no remedy short of
appointing a lawyer to every child would suffice for constitutional purpos-
es.42 If anything, the court could have better justified its decision by defining
children's liberty interests far more broadly, which would have perhaps been
more persuasive to other courts considering the same issue in the future.43 In
any event, upon holding that foster children in Georgia have the right to
counsel in all abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, the court con-
cluded that plaintiffs had demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether they were receiving effective assistance of counsel, making sum-
mary judgment for the defendants inappropriate."
III. DEFINING EFFECTIVE COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN
Once the court denied the counties' summary judgment motions, the
parties quickly came to the settlement table to discuss a mutually agreeable
outcome.45 Separate mediated settlement negotiations were held with each
county, 46 as the factual and political landscape in each locale was quite dif-
ferent. After several months of negotiations, separate consent decrees were
agreed to, and following preliminary approval, notice, and a fairness hearing,
the district court so-ordered them.47 The main features of the decrees are
summarized in this table:
42. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360-61.
43. See Pitchal, supra note 26, at 681.
44. Kenny A., 356 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-64.
45. Id. at 1364; see Notice of Proposed Settlement Regarding the Right of Children to
Have Lawyers in Deprivation Cases at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-
1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2006) (ordering proposed settlement) [hereinafter DeKalb
County Notice of Proposed Settlement]; Notice of Proposed Settlement Regarding the Right
of Children to Have Lawyers in Deprivation Cases at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.
1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2006) (ordering proposed settlement) [hereinafter
Fulton County Notice of Proposed Settlement].
46. See DeKalb County Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 2; Fulton Coun-
ty Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 2.
47. Order at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 24, 2006) [hereinafter DeKalb County Order]; Order at 1-2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Fulton County Order].
414 [Vol.36
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Principle DeKalb decree48  Fulton decree4 9
Caseloads 130 cases maximum per The findings and require-
full-time lawyer will be ments of an independent
allowed. workload study will be au-
tomatically incorporated into
the decree unless a party
objects.
Staffing Seven new attorneys A total of twelve attoreys,
will be hired within a two investigators, and three
year, for a total of ele- support staff must be hired
ven lawyers plus a di- by the signing of an agree-
rector (then subsequent- ment (then subsequently in
ly maintaining com- compliance with the work-
pliance with the re- load study standard).
quired caseload).
Standards of Prac- Child Advocate Attor- Practice standards (con-
tice neys must practice in tained in an appendix to the
accordance with a set of decree and incorporated by
nine "responsibilities of reference) are more detailed
child advocate[s]," and specific than in DeKab
which are enforceable and are also enforceable,
by plaintiffs; perfor- with performance evaluated
mance is to be evaluated by a neutral accountability
by a neutral accounta- agent.
acdcwhstf eea icpadbility agent.
In addition to the substance, both decrees had detailed provisions re-
garding enforcement and duration. 50 Generally speaking, each county had to
be in substantial compliance with the caseload, staffing, and performance
48. Consent Decree Between Plaintiffs & DeKalb County, Georgia at 3-6,
8, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2006) [he-
reinafter DeKalb County Consent Decree], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/06/2006-03-23_ga_dekalb consentdecree.pdf.
49. Consent Decree at 5-7, app. A 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-
1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Feb 13, 2006) [hereinafter Fulton County Consent Decree], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2006-02-13_gajfulton-consent
decree.pdf; see also DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6.
50. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 8-10; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 8-10.
2012]1 415
9
Lustbader and Pitchal: Implementation of the Right to Counsel for Children in Juvenile C
Published by NSUWorks, 2012
NOVA LAW REVIEW
provisions for a sustained period of eighteen months before it could request
an exit from the federal court."
With respect to the caseloads in Fulton (caseloads in DeKalb County
were limited to 130) the workload study (conducted by the University of
Georgia) concluded that there were too many additional factors that impacted
the efficiency of child advocate attorneys to settle on one static caseload
maximum.52 Instead, the study identified a list of structural impediments
within the Juvenile Court and the state's public child welfare agency ("exter-
nal" problems), as well as ongoing issues within the Child Advocate Office
("internal" concerns). The study concluded that if no reforms took place,
then the maximum caseload for child advocate attorneys should be eighty
child-clients at a time.54 If the internal issues were resolved, then the casel-
oads could appropriately rise to 100 per attorney, and if the external impedi-
ments were also removed, then child advocate attorneys could effectively
represent up to 120 child-clients at any one time. 5 Neither party objected to
the workload study's conclusions, so its recommendations were incorporated
automatically into the consent decree as enforceable caseload requirements. 6
The performance standards required by both decrees are the type of la-
wyering tasks that have wide acceptance in the field as fundamental activities
required of all attorneys representing children. Indeed, as the decrees were
being drafted and negotiated, we relied explicitly on the ABA Standards,7
and in many cases incorporated the ABA's approach verbatim. 58 For exam-
ple, both decrees require the child advocate attorney to "establish and main-
tain an attorney-client relationship" with the child-client.5 9 These provisions
were inspired by ABA Standard C-1, which states that "[e]stablishing and
maintaining a relationship . . . is the foundation of representation" and calls
on children's lawyers to meet with their clients-regardless of age-before
51. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 9-10; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 9.
52. See GOVERNMENTAL SERVS. Div., CARL VINSON INST. OF GOv'T, CHILD ADVOCATE
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND WORKLOAD STUDY 142, 152 (2007) [hereinafter FULTON
COUNTY WORKLOAD STUDY], available at http://childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008
/06/2007-06-25_ga_fulton-workload-study.pdf.
53. See id. at 67-70.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6-7.
57. See STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 1-15.
58. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 3, 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 3-4.
59. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree,
supra note 49, at 3.
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court hearings and whenever a case development warrants iti6 Not surpri-
singly, the 2011 Model Act has a similar requirement." Other provisions in
the decrees that came directly from the ABA Standards (and were later codi-
fied in the 2011 Model Act) included: file pleadings, 62 request services by
court order if necessary,63 enforce compliance with court orders that favor the
client," negotiate settlements,65 and participate in appeals.
The county case, along with the state case, plainly met the requirements
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2), and indeed the Kenny
A. litigation was directed at reforming a system in which agency-wide (state
case) and county-wide (county case) failures harmed children and exposed
them all to risks of harm in violation of their rights.67 Discretion in individu-
at cases-or, unfortunately, the absence of discretion-was occurring within
a fundamentally broken system. However, in terms of implementing the
right-to-counsel remedy in the county case, the parties agreed that the exer-
cise of professional legal discretion did not require every lawyering task to
be done on every case.68 Thus, the language in the consent decrees around
practice standards provided some flexibility. 69 For example, in DeKalb, most
performance standards were said to be required as "necessary in the reasona-
ble exercise of professional judgment."7 0 An exception was to "establish and
maintain an attorney-client relationship" with each child as the parties agreed
60. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 7.
61. 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(c).
62. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; see also DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 5; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3; 2011 MODEL
ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b).
63. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b).
64. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 9; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b)(9).
65. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 10; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; see 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b).
66. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 15; DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra
note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 4; see also 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(b).
67. Fulton County Order, supra note 48, at 1; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2); Kenny A.
ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 286 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
68. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 3-4.
69. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 4-5; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 5.
70. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5.
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that this was something that simply had to be done in every case.7' Similar-
ly, in Fulton, many of the standards were applicable "[w]here appropriate
and necessary to the case," though again, the requirement to meet with and
establish an attorney-client relationship with the child was required in every
case. 72
71. Id. at 6.
72. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 4. The parties did not
negotiate for a specific provision regarding the role that the child advocate attorneys should
play-client-directed or "best interests." See id. app. A at 3-4; DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 5. It certainly would have been a reasonable position to argue that
"right to counsel" means the right to a traditional lawyer who operates in accordance with the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 1.14's directions concerning the
representation of a client with a disability (such as minority). See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2011). Instead, as implemented, Kenny A. focused more on the right to
have a lawyer functioning as an attorney-establishing a relationship, investigating the case,
developing a theory, and being a zealous advocate. See DeKalb County Consent Decree,
supra note 48, at 6; Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3. If the position advo-
cated was the lawyer's view of the client's best interests as opposed to the child's wishes, the
parties were content to let that lie. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6;
Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 3. As it turned out, the DeKalb Child Advo-
cate Office took the following position regarding the role of its lawyers:
Counsel's principal duty is to zealously advocate for the client's best interests. The lawyer's
duty is to form a principled position of the child's best interests and advocate for that position.
Nevertheless, the child advocate attorney also has an obligation to inform the court of the
child's desires, even when the child's wishes diverge from the attorney's determination of the
child's best interests. The determination of a child's best interests must be formed by an expli-
cit analysis of the actual available options.
DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, app. B at 3-4. Fulton took a view somewhat
closer to the 1996 ABA Standards:
In Fulton County, child advocate attorneys represent the best interests of the child, while at the
same time representing the child's expressed preferences. This model allows the child to ex-
plain what he or she believes is in his or her best interests. If the child advocate determines
that the child's expressed preference would be seriously injurious to the child (as opposed to
merely being contrary to the lawyer's opinion of what would be in the child's interests), the
child advocate attorney may request appointment of a separate guardian ad litem and continue
to represent the child's expressed preference as the child's attorney, unless the child's position
is prohibited by law or without any factual foundation.
Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 3. In 2009, a new director of the
Fulton Child Advocate Office, who had many years of experience as a public defender, was
hired. See WILLIAM G. JONES, FOURTH KENNY A. REPORT FOR FULTON COUNTY 19 (2010)
[hereinafter FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://ww
w.childrenstights.org/wp-content/uploads//2010/11/2010-lll2_fulton.county-fourth-monitor
ing-report.pdf. Under his leadership, Fulton changed its model of child representation to
client-directed, and the consent decree was modified to reflect this. See Modified Consent
Decree app. A at 2, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga.
May 18, 2009) [hereinafter Fulton County Modified Consent Decree], available at http://www
.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/10/2009-05-19_ga fulton-county-modifiedco
nsent.decree.pdf. The 2011 Model Act reflects this same standard. See 2011 MODEL ACT,
supra note 3, § 7(c).
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For the objective "input" requirements of the right-to-counsel decrees
such as caseloads, staffing, and training, a neutral monitor was required to
review and validate county data and records.7 3 However, assessing the coun-
ties' performance with the agreed-upon lawyering standards required the
involvement of a neutral party to essentially look over the shoulders of the
attorneys. 74 In each county, an "Accountability Agent" was selected to de-
termine whether or not the lawyers were practicing in accordance with the
input requirements and performance standards." On the latter, if in a given
case a lawyer did not file a particular motion, for example, it would also be
up to the accountability agents to determine if this was a reasonable exercise
of professional judgment or a practice error outside such judgment.76
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Designing a monitoring regime that balanced the imperative to assess
the quality of counsel with the need to respect legal professional judgment
was challenging, and made more difficult because Kenny A. was sui gene-
ris.1 The implementation phase of the county case raised an interesting per-
formance question: Assuming that it is possible to judge quality lawyering
in the first place, how "good" is "good enough"? In other words, what is the
minimum quality job performance that would still be considered "effective"
under the consent decrees and would satisfy children's procedural due
process rights? Certainly, the assertion by one of the deponents early in the
litigation that meeting each of her clients was "aspirational," if considered a
normative claim, would be repugnant. But is there a difference between
"best practices" and the constitutional minimum? The Kenny A. decrees and
the monitoring protocols developed to implement them did not address this
issue directly.
73. Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 7. After delineating the many du-
ties of a child's lawyer, the 2011 Model Act notes that "lawyers must have caseloads that
allow realistic performance of these functions." 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b) cmt.
74. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 8.
75. See id. For Fulton County, the parties agreed on the appointment of Judge William
Jones, a retired dependency judge from North Carolina with a national reputation. Id. at 7.
For DeKalb County, the parties selected Karen Beatrice Baynes-Dunning, a former Georgia
juvenile court judge and Associate Director of the Governmental Services Division at the
University of Georgia's Carl Vinson Institute of Government. DeKalb County Consent De-
cree, supra note 48, at 6, 11.
76. See Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 5-8, app. A 4.
77. See id. app. A at 1.
78. See generally Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49. Nor did they need to as
a legal matter. A clear line of Supreme Court precedent allows parties to a consent decree to
agree and enforce terms beyond federal constitutional or statutory minima, and plaintiffs are
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In both counties, after the accountability agents verified that the struc-
tural requirements of the decrees had been met-and both defendants com-
plied with the staffing and caseload obligations in relatively short order79-
their focus turned to assessing compliance with the performance standards
not required to re-prove constitutional violations in an original complaint against challenges
over compliance with a decree that goes beyond such minima. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Haw-
kins, 540 U.S. 431, 439-40 (2004) (showing the remedy was one that the defendant state
officials "had accepted when they asked the District Court to approve the decree" and "[o]nce
entered, a consent decree may be enforced"); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 354 n.6 (1992)
("[P]arties may agree to provisions in a consent decree which exceed the requirements of
federal law." (citing Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992))); Rufo,
502 U.S. at 389-90 ("The position urged by [the defendants] 'would necessarily imply that the
only legally enforceable obligation assumed by the state under the consent decree was that of
ultimately achieving minimal constitutional prison standards. . . . Substantively, this would
do violence to the obvious intention of the parties that the decretal obligations assumed by the
state were not confined to meeting minimal constitutional requirements."' (quoting Plyler v.
Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 1991))); Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) ("[A] federal court is not necessarily barred from
entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial."). The Supreme Court's decision in Home v. Flores, 129 S.
Ct. 2579, 2594-95 (2009)-in which the Court, in the context of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5),
instructed lower courts to evaluate whether a "durable remedy" had been achieved and to
make sure that "responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to
the State and its officials' when the circumstances warrant"-did not alter this precedent. See,
e.g., Juan F. v. Rell, No. 3:89-CV-859, 2010 WL 5590094, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2010)
("Hore ... did not turn 60(b)(5) motions into vehicles to relitigate the original claims of the
underlying litigation, in an effort to determine whether ongoing violations of federal law ex-
ist."); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 171 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasizing that a court "may
not rewrite the existing consent orders so as to reduce defendants' promise to some ill-defined
constitutional floor"); see also LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore v. Gray, 412 F. App'x 315, 315
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming the district court's rejection of a claim under 60(b)(5)
of "durable statutory compliance" under Home).
79. See KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE
REPORT 4-5 [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-0724_ga-dekalbi st-comp
liance-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); WILLIAM G. JONES, THIRD KENNYA. REPORT FOR
FULTON COUNTY 4-8 (2009) [hereinafter FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads//2009/l1/2009-10-
30-ga-fulton-county-thirdperiod monitoring-report.pdf. DeKalb was in compliance with
the caseload standard of 130 almost from the day the court so-ordered the decree, as officials
there increased staffing dramatically even before the summary judgment motion was decided.
See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra at 4-5. Fulton lagged behind
somewhat, as the structural impediments identified by the authors of the Workload Study
remained in place for approximately eighteen months, triggering a caseload obligation of
eighty. See FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra at 5, 18. It was not
until the Third Monitoring Report found that all of the structural blocks had been removed that
the caseload requirement changed to 100. See id. at 18.
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set forth in each decree.so They did this by looking carefully at a sample of
individual cases, assessing whether the attorneys' performance on a variety
of measures was acceptable in each case, and then aggregating the data to get
a systemic view of quality.8' It was left to the parties to decide whether the
accountability agents' findings would support a judicial finding of "substan-
tial compliance" with the consent decrees in the legal sense;8 2 by agreement
of the parties, the accountability agents did not draw this ultimate legal con-
clusion themselves.
Constructing a metric for assessing lawyer performance was a chal-
lenge, but a familiar one for anyone charged with determining compliance
with a standard as opposed to a rule. Courts, of course, are used to working
in the world of standards. The advantage of having a rule as opposed to a
standard is that it provides clarity as to what is expected and how one's per-
formance will be measured. The child advocate attorneys and attorney su-
pervisors in DeKalb and Fulton certainly wanted clarity, but they also
wanted flexibility." For example, the DeKalb County decree required attor-
neys "[t]o establish and maintain an attorney-client relationship with each
Class Member client and to maintain such contacts with the client as are ne-
cessary in the reasonable exercise of professional judgment to ensure ade-
quate and effective legal representation."
The Fulton County decree contained similar language. 86 One could eas-
ily imagine a rule that would operationalize this standard more concretely
such as: The child advocate attorney shall meet with each client within thirty
days of the case opening, once a quarter thereafter, and within ten days of
any placement move. This rule would provide clarity to the lawyer about
80. See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 5-7;
FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 13-14, 64-66.
81. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 13-15;
KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE REPORT 2
(2008) [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://
www.childrenstights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/2008-07-22_gajdekalb_3rdcomplianc
ereportl.pdf.
82. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 10-11; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, at 7-9.
83. See DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 23;
FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.
84. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 1.
85. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6.
86. Compare id., with Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 3-5.
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what is expected and to the monitor about what to look for. However, in
the context of legal services, the parties decided against a minimum number
of contacts and instead agreed upon implementation and measurement that
was flexible.
The accountability agent in each county constructed a protocol to ana-
lyze several dozen lawyer activities-activities that came from the require-
ments of each respective decree.89 In both counties, a random sample of cas-
es was selected during each monitoring period-approximately every six
months-to be reviewed using the protocol. 90  A numerical scale was
created, and each activity in each case was scored on the scale.9' In DeKalb,
the accountability agent looked at the child's attorney file for each case in the
sample and then interviewed the attorney to get a better understanding of
what did and did not occur in that particular case.92 The accountability agent
assigned a score of zero to four for each item on the protocol for each case
and aggregated the data by item.94 The Fulton accountability agent also used
a protocol for file reviews, but supplemented this with a separate protocol,
which he used to assess in-court performance. 95 He used a scale of zero to
three for each item on these protocols. 96
87. See 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, § 7(b)(5), (8). The 2011 Model Act requires
lawyers to meet with child-clients before every court hearing, after every placement change,
and at least once a quarter. Id.
88. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 5-6; Fulton County Consent
Decree, supra note 49, app. A at 1, 3-5.
89. KAREN B. BAYNES, DEKALB COUNTY CHILD ADVOCACY CENTER COMPLIANCE
REPORT 20 [hereinafter DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-12-19_ga-dekalb_2ndcom
pliance-report.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2012); WILLIAM G. JONES, FIRST FULTON COUNTY
KENNY A. REPORT 10-11 (2008) [hereinafter FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING
REPORT], available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2008-0111
-ga-fulton_1stcompliance-report.pdf.
90. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 2; FULTON
COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49.
91. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 2; e.g.,
FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49, 51-52.
92. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8. A mas-
ter's-level social worker also reviewed each file to determine whether the child's needs were
being met. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 2.
93. An item scored "0" was deemed not applicable for that given case. DEKALB COUNTY
FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8. Otherwise, "I" was for poor perfor-
mance, "2" for needs improvement, "3" for satisfactory, and "4" for excellent. Id.
94. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 14.
95. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 49; FULTON
COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 14.
96. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 14. Initially,
the Fulton agent used a zero-to-four scale similar to that in the DeKalb study. See FULTON
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The accountability agents operationalized the requirement to "establish
and maintain an attorney-client relationship," for example, by looking for
evidence of meetings with clients and content containing the client's posi-
tion.97 In reviewing the DeKalb files, the accountability agent looked for
content evidencing "client interviews" and also assessed whether the attorney
notes contained the "child's position."98 She rated each file on the zero-to-
four scale for these items.99 Similarly, in Fulton, the file review protocol
looked at child interviews, but there were five separate items assessed under
this category, including the: 1) child's position, 2) number of contacts, 3)
explanation of the court process, 4) length of contact, and 5) attorney-client
relationship."3 0 The court observation protocol contained an item called
"[c]ourt informed of [c]hild's [p]osition."'o' All of these items were rated on
the Fulton zero-to-three scale.102
This approach to monitoring lawyer performance raised interesting
measurement challenges. For a given case, what distinguishes "client inter-
views" that need improvement from those that are satisfactory? From an
attorney file alone, is it possible to say that an attorney's explanation of the
court process to a ten year-old met expectations, as opposed to exceeded
them? What factors are used to determine whether the overall attorney-client
relationship met expectations? The parties simply trusted the neutrality and
experience of the accountability agents to be able to assess performance,
giving appropriate deference to the professional judgment of the attorneys,
while still holding them accountable for a certain base level of perfor-
mance.103
COuNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 65. Later the scale was
changed to zero-to-three. FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note
79, at 14. Under the revised scale, an item scored "zero" was deemed not applicable for that
given case. Id. Otherwise, "I" was for performance that did not meet expectations, "2" was
for performance that did meet expectations, and "3" was for performance that exceeded ex-
pectations. Id.
97. See DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 24, 27.
98. Id.
99. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 8.
100. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 59.
101. Id. at 70.
102. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 74.
103. The consent decrees did not preclude challenges to the findings of the respective
accountability agents. See DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 6-8; Fulton
County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6. Additionally, the accountability agents shared
drafts of their findings and each of their monitoring reports for comment before finalizing
them and before they were filed with the court. See, e.g., DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD
MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 13. As it turned out, the parties never disputed the
findings. See generally DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81;
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The aggregation of this data presented a legal enforcement challenge
and, at least in theory, a constitutional question. If, for example, in 75% of
cases the number and length of the contacts were satisfactory or better, but in
only 30% of cases did the attorney satisfactorily explain the court process,"
has there been effective assistance of counsel in the constitutional sense?
What percentage of items, in what percentage of cases, have to be at the "sa-
tisfactory" level or higher to say that there has been "substantial compliance"
with the decree? To say that constitutionally effective representation has
been provided? To say that the 1996 ABA Standards or the 2011 Model Act
standards have been met?
The parties never had to confront these questions in Kenny A. because
the conclusions that could be drawn from each monitoring report were quite
clear.'05 DeKalb showed evidence of compliance with the decree from the
first monitoring report and sustained this level for eighteen months, entitling
it to court-approved exit from court supervision.'06 Fulton initially struggled
to meet the caseload requirements of its decree, and it took multiple monitor-
ing reports before it began to show consistent compliance with the perfor-
mance requirements.107 Once it demonstrated compliance with the quality
standards, there was no dispute, and after sustaining its performance for eigh-
teen months, Fulton also exited with court approval.'0o
The changes over the life of the Kenny A. litigation in both counties'
approaches to child advocacy and actual performance were remarkable. In
2002 when the case was filed, the child advocate attorneys had upwards of
500 clients each, could not have possibly-and had not-met most of their
clients, and had no support staff, investigators, or access to social workers or
DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89; DEKALB COUNTY
FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79; FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD
MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72; FULTON COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT,
supra note 79; WILLIAM G. JONES, KENNY A. REPORT SECOND FULTON COUNTY (2008) [herei-
nafter FULTON COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://www.
childrenrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/2008-08-01 _ga_2nd-fulton monitoring.rep
ort.pdf; FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89.
104. See, e.g., FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 59.
105. And again, in terms of the enforcement of consent decrees versus constitutional mi-
nima, they did not need to. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
106. DeKalb County Consent Decree, supra note 48, at 3, 10; Georgia County Exits Court
Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for Foster Children, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
(Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.childrensrights.org/news-events/press/georgia-county-poised-to-
exit-court-oversight-after-reform-of-legal-representation-for-foster-children/.
107. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 10.
108. Georgia's Fulton County Poised to Exit Court Oversight, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (Apr.
12, 2011), http://www.childrensrights.org/news-events/press/georgia%E2%80%99s-fultoncou
nty-poised-to-exit-court-oversight/.
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independent experts.'" They were hired and supervised directly by the Ju-
venile Court judges before whom they appeared, often functioning more as
courtroom managers than as advocates or lawyers." 0 Fulton County had four
lawyers with virtually no support,"' and DeKalb County had two.'12 In con-
trast, when DeKalb exited in 2008, attorneys there had caseloads ranging
from sixty-five to ninety.' 13 There was an independent Child Advocacy Cen-
ter staffed by a director and eleven full-time case-carrying attorneys-
including two supervisors, as well as four investigators and four paraleg-
als;'l 4 regular internal performance reviews were being conducted, with cor-
rective action plans instituted where appropriate;" attorneys attended train-
ings on a regular basis on child welfare law and related topics, at both local
and national conferences;"'6 and the level of advocacy was consistently
high."' 7 In the words of the DeKalb accountability agent, "[t]here is a sys-
temic and deliberate process of quality improvement that while originally
mandated [as part of] the consent decree, has now become [part of] the cul-
ture of the [Child Advocacy] Center."" 8
Likewise, by the time Fulton exited in 2011, all internal reforms called
for by the workload study had been implemented, triggering a caseload max-
imum of 100;"9 caseloads were in fact consistently far under 100;I20 an inde-
pendent Child Advocate Board had been established under county govern-
ment, which was responsible for hiring and supervising the director of the
Child Advocate Office;'21 the Child Advocate Office was staffed with the
director, sixteen full-time attorneys-including one supervisor, four adminis-
trative support staff, four investigators, two social services coordinators, and
one educational advocate;122 the staff participated in a variety of comprehen-
sive training courses;123 the rate and number of client contacts and attorney
109. Georgia County Exits Court Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for
Foster Children, supra note 106.
110. Id.
I 11. See Georgia's Fulton County Poised to Exit Court Oversight, supra note 108.
112. See Georgia County Exits Court Oversight After Reform of Legal Representation for
Foster Children, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 3.
115. Id. at l2-13.
116. DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79, at 6.
117. DEKALB COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 5.
118. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 6.
119. Georgia's Fulton County Poised to Exit Court Oversight, supra note 108.
120. Id.
121. FULTON COUNTY SECOND PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 103, at 40.
122. FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 21.
123. Id. at 42-51.
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participation in extra-judicial meetings and proceedings was exceptionally
high; 124 and for most of the items on the attorney file and court observation
protocols, the accountability agent found the performance to meet or exceed
expectations in well over 90% of the cases. 125 Remarkably, during the final
year of the consent decree, the assistant county attorney who had represented
Fulton County throughout the Kenny A. case elected to leave his position and
become the director of the Child Advocate Office,126 surely having been in-
spired by the level of practice the office had achieved and the challenge of
sustaining it once the incentive of satisfying the federal court's order was
gone.
A number of factors explain this dramatic turnaround and the counties'
successful experience under the Kenny A. right-to-counsel reform effort.
Clearly, a significant but-for cause was the existence of the litigation itself;
there is no action quite like a civil rights class action to protect and remedy
violations of the rights of vulnerable citizens by a government defendant.
Securing the right to counsel and negotiating a favorable consent decree was
only part of the litigation story, however; the implementation that followed
was successful for independent reasons. First, the presence of the accounta-
bility agents in the case and the seriousness of purpose with which they ap-
proached their role cannot be overstated. Judge Baynes was local and was
deeply familiar with the Georgia Juvenile Court and child welfare systems,
and she had the credibility and back-up support from the University of Geor-
gia.'27 While Judge Jones was based in North Carolina, he spent countless
days and weeks on-site in Fulton County, not only conducting his reviews
but also offering meaningful technical assistance to the Child Advocate Of-
fice leadership and staff as they revamped processes and procedures and
created a new culture of advocacy. Both Judges Baynes and Jones had
enormous credibility with the parties from the beginning.128
Second, there was complete commitment from local leadership; both
within the new child advocacy structures in each county as well as the broad-
er county government, and the county leaders involved in Kenny A. set their
124. See id. at 59, 61.
125. Id. at 75.
126. Id. at 19.
127. See DeKalb County Notice of Proposed Settlement, supra note 45, at 6.
128. Judge Baynes was also the author of the Fulton County Child Advocate Attorney
Representation and Workload Study. Fulton County Consent Decree, supra note 49, at 6.
Plaintiffs readily agreed to Fulton County's request that a study be conducted in order to set
the caseload requirements. Id. at 5. The fact that the study was so well done, by a respected
former judge, who was part of a respected institute at the University of Georgia, eliminated
the prospect of further litigation and created conditions for buy-in and conciliation. See id. at
6-7.
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sights early on full and sustained compliance. After trying a few different
ways to structure the program, Fulton County ultimately settled on the crea-
tion of an independent Child Advocate Board to oversee the office, removing
it from the Fulton County Juvenile Court.129 DeKalb hired a charismatic and
passionate attorney to direct its new Child Advocacy Center,3 o and she made
compliance with the Kenny A. decree her number one management priority.
Third, while Plaintiffs' counsel maintained the ability to enforce the de-
crees through contempt litigation (and had done so in the state case),131 the
ongoing monitoring and negotiation process in the county case very quickly
took on an atmosphere of open sharing of problems and collaboration among
the parties, and the accountability agents effectively acted as both reporters
of performance and conveners of the parties, sometimes by effectively utiliz-
ing shuttle diplomacy.13 2 This factor, without question in our view, limited
the delay and expense of separate enforcement litigation.
Undoubtedly, compliance in both counties was aided by a fourth reason
outside the parties' control: a rapidly declining foster care census. Many of
the problems in the delivery of effective, adequate, and zealous counsel
flowed from grossly unmanageable caseloads. Because of changes at the
state level (among other reasons), the overall caseloads that child advocate
attorneys carried in DeKalb County dropped from approximately 900 when
the case was filed to 750 when DeKalb exited in 2008.1'3 The decline in
Fulton was from approximately 2000 when the case was filed to 1005 in
2010.'3 Notwithstanding the enormous increase in staffing in both counties,
the drop in the foster care census made the caseload ratios in the county de-
crees more quickly attainable.
129. Id. at4-5.
130. DEPARTMENT DIRECTORS, OFFICE OF THE CEO, DEKALB COUNTY, http://www.co.
dekalb.ga.us/portals/ceo/trennystovall.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
131. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Order for Defendants to Show Cause Why They Should
Not be Adjudged in Civil Contempt & Sanctioned at 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.
1:02-cv-1686-MHS (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2008); Stipulation Regarding Plaintiffs' Contempt &
Discovery Motions & Assertion of State Defendants' Noncompliance with Outcome Measures
9 & 10 at 1, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No.1:02-cv-1686-M HS (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11,
2008), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-06-25
gajfultonworkloadstudy.pdf.
132. See generally DEKALB COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 79;
FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89.
133. DEKALB COUNTY THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 81, at 7.
134. FULTON COUNTY FIRST PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 89, at 41; FULTON
COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 25.
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V. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES A LAWYER MAKE?
Asserting the Kenny A. right-to-counsel claims in tandem with claims
seeking comprehensive reforms in the state child welfare agency allowed the
dangerously poor Atlanta foster care system to provide a compelling context
for the need for counsel for children in the juvenile courts. As it turned out,
Kenny A. offers something of a natural experiment in which to observe the
impact of improvements in child advocacy with parallel improvements in
outcomes for the lawyers' clients. At the same time that the county case was
progressing, the plaintiffs' claims against the state-with respect to the oper-
ation of the foster care system in metropolitan Atlanta-were moving for-
ward. The state case was settled with a negotiated consent decree in 2005,
requiring the state to increase its performance on thirty-one outcome meas-
ures, many of them phased-in over several years, related to the safety, per-
manency, and well-being of class members.135 The State Consent Decree
also included process and infrastructure requirements in many areas, includ-
ing, among others, caseload limits for agency case managers and supervisors
assigned to foster children; 36 the investigation of reports of abuse or neg-
lect;'37 limits on the use of non-family placements-shelters, groups, homes,
and institutions-for foster children;138 the oversight of private providers
under contract with the state to deliver services for foster children;'39 the
delivery of medical, dental, and mental health for foster children; and the
requirements of a child welfare management information system. 140
To date, in several areas of the State Consent Decree, significant
progress has been made for foster children in DeKalb and Fulton County.
For example, the State Consent Decree requires children who enter foster
care along with one or more siblings to be placed together with all of their
siblings;141 from 2006 to 2010, compliance increased from 73% to 94%.142
The State Consent Decree also requires the state to make appropriate ar-
135. Consent Decree at 31-38, Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS
[hereinafter State Consent Decree], https://www.gascore.com/forms/docs/ConsentDecree.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
136. Id. at 22-23.
137. Id. at 28.
138. Id. at 15-19.
139. Id. at 23-24.
140. State Consent Decree, supra note 135, at 20-22.
141. See id. at 6.
142. JAMES T. DIMAS & SARAH A. MORRISON, PERIOD III MONITORING REPORT 41 (2007)
[hereinafter STATE THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT], available at http://www.childrensi
ghts.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/2007-12-17_gastate..period3_monitoring-report.pdf;
STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 7, 13.
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rangements for parent-child visits when the child's permanency goal is reuni-
fication; 143 from 2007 to 2010, compliance increased from 25% to 88%.
Additionally, according to data compiled by the state and verified by the
court-appointed "Accountability Agents" in the state case, improvements
have been made and sustained in placing foster children closer to their home
communities and limiting the use of facilities and institutions as placements
for foster children, especially young children.145
The correlation between reforms in the right-to-counsel decrees from
2006 to 2010 and some of the positive outcomes for foster children under the
state decree are striking. Needless to say, however, correlation does not nec-
essarily indicate causation. Many variables contribute to success in child
welfare outcomes. For example, while zealous advocacy by child advocate
attorneys may well have contributed to keeping more siblings together in
foster care or ensuring more visits with children and their parents, the con-
tinued pressure of the Kenny A. state case and increased resources and tools
available to agency case managers likely played a role as well. Absent a
tightly designed, randomized control group study-in which the control
group gets "regular" advocacy, the experimental group gets a model of advo-
cacy based on the requirements of the Kenny A. county decrees, and all other
variables are controlled for-it would be nearly impossible to draw causal
links between the "input" of adequate, effective, and zealous advocacy in the
juvenile courts and measurable improvements in child welfare outcomes.'
143. State Consent Decree, supra note 135, at 36.
144. STATE THIRD PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 142, at 41; STATE TENTH
PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 45.
145. STATE TENTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 34, at 6, 102. To be sure,
despite areas of progress, the defendants in the state case still lag in making required im-
provements in a number of areas, such as efforts to move children into permanent homes out
of state custody, particularly through adoption; the timely investigation of reports of child
abuse or neglect for foster children already in state custody; the delivery of mental health and
development screens and treatment for foster children; and providing required services for
children before they are discharged from custody. See id. at 23-29, 53-59, 63-66, 93-97,
105-06,110,112-15.
146. At least one national project currently underway has the potential to evaluate the
delivery of quality representation for children in dependency cases. Overview, QIC-
CHILDREP, http://www.improvechildrep.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). "In . . . 2009, the
U.S. Children's Bureau [selected the] University of Michigan Law School [for] the National
Quality Improvement Center on the Representation of Children in the Child Welfare System
(QIC-ChildRep)." Id. According to the official website of the QIC-ChildRep, "[t]he QIC-
ChildRep, is a five-year, [five] million dollar project to gather, develop and communicate
knowledge on child representation, promote consensus on the role of the child's legal repre-
sentative, and provide one of the first empirically-based analyses of how legal representation
for the child might best be delivered." Id.
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Importantly, is such research even desirable to show the utility of adopt-
ing the 2011 Model Act? Even if one could design and conduct such re-
search and draw causal inferences, it is not at all clear that such a project
would be good for children or for the rule of law. The normative value of
providing lawyers to those who face a significant liberty deprivation-the
clarion promise of Gideon v. Wainwright,147 In re Gault,148 and Mathews-
outweighs the cold calculus of whether or not these lawyers contribute, in the
aggregate, to faster permanency or increased placements of siblings together,
among other desirable outcomes. Firstly, the lawyer's charge is to zealously
represent the individual client, without regard to what, in the aggregate, con-
stitutes a "good" outcome for a class of children. Indeed, the Kenny A. right
to counsel litigation sought to establish a right to counsel, ensure lawyers had
the tools to do their work-caseload caps, training, etc.-and ensure at least
a minimal quality of lawyering in practice.149  The Kenny A.'case never
sought particular outcomes in individual cases.
Secondly, and perhaps more vitally, lawyers serve an inherently critical
role in the justice system that far exceeds quantifiable outcomes, whether in
the aggregate or in individual cases. To be sure, lawyers seek to achieve
outcomes that can be said to be "good" for their clients.150 But they also di-
rectly and indirectly work zealously to protect, enhance, and champion their
clients' procedural rights. As a voice for the voiceless, lawyers for child-
ren-as well as lawyers for indigent clients throughout the civil and criminal
systems-"make a difference" by telling clients' stories and seeking justice
regardless of outcomes. Regardless of how many criminal trials end in a
guilty verdict, we do not question the value of defense lawyers' advocacy
merely because it cannot be proven that they achieve "good" outcomes for
their clients.' 5'
147. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
148. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
149. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1357, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
150. This is true even for children's lawyers in the dependency context, whether they
follow a client-directed or a best interests model; the only difference is who gets to decide
what a "good" outcome looks like-the client, or the lawyer. QIC Best Practice Model of
Child Representation, QIC-CHILDREP, http://www.improvechildrep.org/DemonstrationProject
s/QICChildRepBestPracticeModel.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
151.
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial un-
less counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both
state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defen-
dants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers
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VI. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM KENNY A. FOR PROPONENTS OF
THE 2011 MODEL ACT
Unsurprisingly, many provisions of the 2011 Model Act are very simi-
lar to the 1996 ABA Standards.15 2 Because the Kenny A. county decrees drew
upon the ABA Standards, anyone interested in implementing the 201 t Model
Act can fairly look to the Kenny A. experience for lessons on how to put its
principles into practice.
A. Implementation Matters
The right to counsel, like all rights-especially positive rights-requires
ongoing, systematic attention to transform it from a principle into practice.
In the absence of a meaningful implementation plan that addresses all core
components, the right will at best be provided in an idiosyncratic, ad hoc
way.
B. Caseloads Matter
By far the biggest controlled "input" under the right-to-counsel county
decrees was the workloads of lawyers. 5  Without question, at a certain level,
caseloads become so high that the right to counsel is compromised.'54 Before
performance standards or other aspects of the right to counsel can be fully
addressed, the caseload issue must be tackled.
C. Leadership Matters
Implementation of the right to counsel for all children in all dependency
cases represents a major change in values for most jurisdictions. To be ef-
fective, the reform efforts must be led by creative, passionate, and dedicated
to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on pro-
cedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
152. Compare 2011 MODEL ACT, supra note 3, with STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, Supra note
4.
153. See Fulton County Modified Consent Decree, supra note 72, at 4; see also FULTON
COUNTY WORKLOAD STUDY, supra note 52, at 4.
154. Fulton County Modified Consent Decree, supra note 72, at 4.
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leaders who can simultaneously understand the big picture while focusing on
details. They need to be able to form and maintain good relationships with
many stakeholders while still being advocates for their program in order to
develop the internal capacity within the advocacy office for maintaining fi-
delity to the practice model and to be able to develop policies and proce-
dures, mentor staff, identify problems, and self-correct.
D. Client Directed Representation is Achievable
Fulton County, the largest urban county comprising metropolitan Atlan-
ta,'15 made the change relatively smoothly while meeting all the performance
standards for quality representation in the decree.'
E. Training and Support Matter
Child welfare law is a specialized area of practice. Implementing the
right to counsel in this area requires a comprehensive training plan and ade-
quate support from social workers, investigators, and paraprofessionals.'57
Fulton and DeKalb County were successful because program leaders recog-
nized this and political leaders made an appropriate investment in these
areas.
F. Independence from the Judiciary Matters
States vary in how their programs for appointing counsel to indigent
clients are operated. Some are administered by an executive branch agency
and some are by the administrative office of the courts; some are run as a
state government function and others are at the county level. 58 Regardless, it
is critical that the individuals who serve as court-appointed counsel do so
independently of the bench officers before whom they appear.
155. Fulton County, Georgia QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.g
ov/qfd/states/13/13121.htmi (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
156. See FULTON COUNTY FOURTH PERIOD MONITORING REPORT, supra note 72, at 4.
157. NAT'L Ass'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 4-5, 8.
158. See Child Abuse Prevention & Treatment Act (CAPTA) Amendments of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-235, § 107(b)(2)(A)(v)(1-VI), (vii), I 10 Stat. 3063, 3073.
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G. Performance Can Be Measured Without Invading Professional
Discretion or Requiring "Good Results"
When the client population is too young to lodge formal complaints and
lacks the capacity and resources to select their own counsel, there must be a
mechanism to ensure quality professional performance. The Kenny A. expe-
rience shows this can be done effectively even in the absence of consensus
over what "good outcomes" are or an easy ability to measure causation-in
addition to the questionable utility in measuring causation.159 It is important
to develop a culture of process in which it is accepted wisdom that lawyers
are an essential protection for children regardless of how any one case turns
out.
Our experience in the investigation, litigation, settlement, and imple-
mentation phases of the Kenny A. litigation strongly suggests that ultimately,
while impact litigation created a needed push, these two county defendants
genuinely recognized that providing effective counsel to all children in
abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings was, and remains, the right
thing to do. That realization, perhaps more than any factor, transformed the
system for representing children in those counties.
159. See supra Part V.
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